



























Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology 
in the Graduate College of the 








 Master’s Committee: 
 
 Professor Gregory A. Miller 




Trait and state negative affect contribute to the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology, though the mechanisms through which they exert their effects remain 
unclear.  The present study was motivated by the hypothesis that attentional-control 
deficits will help to understand the biological and psychological mechanisms involved in 
the potentially distinct contributions that trait and state NA make in initiating and 
maintaining mental disorders.  Brain activation associated with trait and state negative 
affect was measured by fMRI during performance of an emotion-word Stroop task.  Trait 
negative affect was associated with reduced activity in areas involved in top-down, goal-
directed attentional control.  In contrast, state negative affect was associated with more 
activity in regions involved in bottom-up, stimulus-driven attentional control.  Present 
results suggest that these two emotional facets are associated with distinct attentional 
control deficits, which has implications for the prevention and treatment of psychological 
disorders. 
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Anxiety and depressive disorders, two of the most common classes of mental 
health disorders, are associated with significant social and occupational impairments and 
lead to considerable emotional, economic, and societal burden (Kessler & Greenberg, 
2002; Wang, Simon, & Kessler, 2003).  Anxiety and depression frequently co-occur 
(Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Kessler et al., 1994; Sanderson, 
DiNardo, Rapee , & Barlow, 1990), with comorbidity present in approximately one-half of 
those diagnosed with an anxiety or depressive disorder (for reviews, see Breier, Charney, & 
Heninger, 1985; Clark, 1989; Gersh & Fowles, 1979).  The co-occurrence of these 
disorders has an even greater impact than either alone, leading to greater impairments in 
psychosocial function, greater severity of disorder, elevated rates of suicidality and 
morbidity, increased health service use, increased treatment resistance, and poorer short- 
and long-term outcomes (Judd et al., 1998; Lydiard & Brawman-Mintzer, 1998).  
Therefore, it is crucial to identify risk factors associated with anxiety and depression in 
order to prevent the onset and recurrence of these disorders.    
In order to identify risk factors shared by anxiety and depression, it is necessary to 
explore their overlap.  Research indicates that anxiety and depression share a general 
distress factor, negative affect (NA), which was initially conceptualized as reflecting the 
negative mood states that characterize these disorders, including worry, nervousness, anger, 
fear, guilt, and sadness (Clark & Watson, 1991a).  Further theorizing extended the 
conceptualization of the overlap between anxiety and depression to the stable personality 
dimension of negative temperament or neuroticism (Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994), 
which has since received an abundance of empirical support (for review, see Clark, 2005).  
Thus, both state and trait negative affect are associated with the development and 
maintenance of clinically significant anxiety and depression. 
Although trait negative affect is associated with a disposition to experience 
negative mood states (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Watson & Clark, 1984), research indicates 
that it has other important facets that persist even outside of negative mood states.  Trait 
NA is linked to poor self-esteem, pessimism, and a propensity to make somatic complaints 
(Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989).  
Individuals high in trait NA report that they are less satisfied with themselves and describe 
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themselves more negatively than individuals low in trait NA (for review, see Watson & 
Clark, 1984).  Furthermore, individuals high in trait NA often dwell on failures, mistakes, 
and disappointments (Watson & Clark, 1984) and have deficient mood-regulation skills 
(Costa, Somerfield, & McCrae, 1986; Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001).  Trait NA has 
significant implications for psychopathology, as it is a risk factor that predicts the impact of 
life stress, as well as the onset and outcome of affective disorders (for review, see Ormel, 
Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004).  
Recent research in the anxiety and depression literature has shown that another 
crucial risk factor is cognitive dysfunction, including deficits in executive functions and 
biased processing of negative information (Clark & Beck, 2010; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).  Unsurprisingly, trait and state NA are also associated with 
biased cognitive processing, which likely perpetuates them and leads to the development 
and maintenance of anxiety and depression.  Trait NA is associated with biases in 
perception, memory, and interpretation, such that high trait NA individuals recognize and 
recall negative information more readily than do low trait NA individuals (Larsen, 1992, 
Martin, 1985, for review, see Watson & Clark, 1984), interpret ambiguous information in a 
more negative manner (Haney, 1973), and appraise situations as more stressful and 
threatening (Gallagher, 1990; Hemenover & Dienstbier, 1996; Oliver & Brough, 2002).  
Furthermore, trait NA is associated with a negative attributional style, negative self-
referential thinking, and dysfunctional judgments and beliefs about oneself, others, and the 
world (Luten, Ralph, & Mineka, 1997; Clark & Watson, 1991b; Watson & Clark, 1984).  
Therefore, negative affect on a trait level appears to exert top-down influence on the 
perceptions and interpretations of sensory events, social interactions, and other data about 
the environment, in turn influencing beliefs, attitudes, and expectations.   
Research indicates that mood states, like personality traits, also influence various 
cognitive processes (for review, see Silvia & Warburton, 2004).  Negative mood states 
narrow attention to focus on local details, restrict the range of thoughts and actions that 
come to mind, and bias perception and memory toward negatively-valenced words 
(Chepenik, Cornew, & Farah, 2007; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997).  
Negative moods can also affect judgments about various things, including life satisfaction, 
3 
 
likelihood of events, and morality of actions (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007).  Additionally, 
negative moods are associated with a systematic processing strategy that relies on bottom-
up processing and attention to situational details, with little reliance on pre-existing 
knowledge (for reviews, see Heller & Nitschke, 1997; Schwarz & Clore, 1996).  Emotional 
states evoke emotion knowledge that is experiential and context-dependent (Robinson & 
Clore, 2002).  Conversely, it has been proposed that emotional traits are based on an 
individual’s stable beliefs about their emotions in general, which may or may not be 
activated by certain situations (Robinson & Clore, 2002).  Emotion knowledge associated 
with traits appears to be somewhat context-independent.  Therefore, it seems likely that in 
emotional contexts certain cognitive processes are modulated differentially by transient 
emotional states and enduring traits.  Thus, the present study aims to disentangle the 
correlates of trait and state NA, given that many studies confound their effects and preclude 
understanding potentially unique cognitive mechanisms through which they serve as risk 
factors for psychological disorders. 
The anxiety and depression literatures provide some clues to the specific 
cognitive mechanisms associated with trait and state NA that lead to the development and 
maintenance of psychopathology.  This literature suggests that deficits in attentional control 
may underlie the cognitive dysfunction and biases observed in both anxiety and depression 
(e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Engels et al., 2010; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010).  For anxiety, two pervasive cognitive findings are 
1) an early attentional bias to threatening stimuli and 2) difficulty ignoring salient 
distracting information, which interferes with task-relevant processing (for reviews, see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Sass et al., 2010).  It has been suggested that these problems reflect 
a disruption in the balance between two attentional systems, such that anxiety decreases the 
influence of a goal-directed, top-down attentional system and increases the influence of a 
stimulus-driven, bottom-up attentional system (Bishop, 2007; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; 
Eysenck et al., 2007).   
Similarly, depressed individuals also selectively attend to negative stimuli (when 
given sufficient time to elaborate on such stimuli) and have difficulty disengaging from this 
information (for review, see Gotlib & Joorman, 2010).  Individuals who depressively 
ruminate about negative moods and their implications appear to have deficits in cognitive 
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control mechanisms, such that they have difficulty removing irrelevant information from 
working memory and flexibly switching attention to focus on the task at hand (see Banich 
et al., 2009; Engels et al., 2010).  Therefore, impairments in attentional control, particularly 
in the face of emotional information, characterize both depression and anxiety.   
Importantly, attentional control deficits have also been associated with trait and state NA 
(Bredemeier, Berenbaum, Most, & Simons, 2011; Compton, 2000; Derryberry & Reed, 
1994), a link that may constitute one mechanism through which trait and state NA trigger 
and maintain serious psychological symptoms.   
Research on attentional control deficits in anxiety and depression has utilized 
neuroimaging methods in order to identify neural mechanisms associated with dysfunction 
in attentional systems.  Biological measures are particularly valuable in that they can 
provide information inaccessible though self-report and behavioral assessment (Miller & 
Keller, 2000).  They have the potential to identify individuals at risk for developing an 
initial or co-occurring psychological disorder or relapsing after recovery before other 
markers of vulnerability manifest in behavior or become accessible to awareness and hence 
reportable.  Additionally, they can elucidate when individuals are using alternate 
processing strategies that are maladaptive and may eventually break down in more 
challenging contexts or when additional brain areas are being recruited to compensate for 
dysfunction in others.   
Neuroimaging work examining the successful implementation of attentional 
control in the context of emotional distracters has implicated several key areas, including 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Banich 
et al., 2009; Compton et al., 2003; Herrington et al., 2010; Mohanty et al., 2007; Whalen et 
al., 1998).  Not surprisingly, research in clinical neuroscience has found that these areas 
function abnormally in anxiety and depression, such that dysfunction in the DLPFC, as 
well as in both dorsal and rostral portions of the ACC, has been associated with difficulty 
ignoring distracting emotional information (e.g., Bishop, 2008; Engels et al, 2007; 2010; 
Herrington et al., 2010).  Additionally, various parts of the parietal cortex, including the 
precuneus and superior and inferior parietal lobules, play a role in attentional control in 
both emotional and nonemotional contexts (Banich et al., 2000b; Compton et al., 2003; 
Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008) and are disrupted in anxiety and depression (Bruder et 
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al., 1997; Engels et al., 2007; for review, see Heller, 1993; Heller, Koven, & Miller, 2003).  
Given that anxiety and depression are both associated with dysfunction in the DLPFC, 
ACC, and parietal cortex, it seems likely that trait and state NA are linked to disruption in 
those areas as well, leading to attentional-control problems that may predispose individuals 
to develop psychological disorders, as well as maintain them. 
We propose that state and trait negative affect differentially impact the two 
systems implementing attentional control (i.e., bottom-up and top-down systems; Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008).  According to Corbetta et al. (2008), the dorsal 
frontoparietal network (or top-down system) includes posterior portions of middle frontal 
gyrus (MFG) extending into premotor areas, frontal eye fields (FEF), and dorsal parietal 
cortex (particularly intraparietal sulcus and superior parietal lobule), whereas the ventral 
frontoparietal network (or bottom-up system) includes anterior parts of MFG, inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), and temporal parietal junction (TPJ).  Given that trait NA is associated 
with a reliance on beliefs and knowledge that is somewhat context-independent, we 
propose that it is associated with dysfunction in the goal-directed top-down attentional 
system, which is influenced by current goals, expectations, and pre-existing information.  
Furthermore, we expect that negative mood states will be associated with disrupted 
function in the stimulus-driven, bottom-up attentional system, given that negative moods 
are related to a systematic, bottom-up processing strategy and attending to contextual 
details.  Some neuroimaging support for this proposal comes from a study that 
distinguished between state and trait anxiety effects in attentional control (Bishop, 2007).  
Trait anxiety disrupted function in top-down attentional areas, including the DLPFC and 
ACC, whereas state anxiety negatively impacted function in the amgydala, which has been 
linked to bottom-up processing.  The present study is based on theorizing that extends this 
research to examine emotional traits and states more broadly (i.e., negative affect).  
Furthermore, broader attentional networks are also considered in the present study, 
including those proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002), as well as Banich (2009, 
discussed below).  These networks include parietal areas as well as specific areas of the 
DLPFC that are involved in bottom-up processing (and not just top-down-control 
processing that is typically assumed to be the main role of the DLPFC).   
6 
 
The cascade-of-control model (Banich, 2009) proposes that distinct areas of the 
DLPFC implement different functions necessary for attentional control.  It posits that 
posterior DLPFC is involved in imposing a top-down attentional set that maintains overall 
task goals and biases posterior brain regions (e.g., parietal cortex) toward processing task-
relevant information and away from task-irrelevant information (which can occur even 
before stimuli are received), whereas mid-DLPFC is involved stimulus processing such that 
it selects and maintains the most relevant aspects of stimuli that have been received 
(Banich, 2009).  Herrington et al. (2010) supported this distinction in terms of emotion-
modulated attentional processing. Individuals selected for high trait-like levels of 
anhedonic depression exhibited reduced posterior DLPFC activity in response to negative 
stimuli.  In contrast, mid-DLPFC was more active for positive stimuli, regardless of levels 
of anhedonic depression.  It was proposed that posterior DLPFC imposes more static, 
persistent, context-insensitive aspects of an affective set and is associated with trait affect 
and top-down processes, whereas mid-DLPFC imposes aspects of an affective set that are 
more transient, stimulus-driven, context-dependent, and related to state affect and bottom-
up processes.  The cascade-of-control model also includes areas of the ACC that are 
involved in response selection and response evaluation.  The model asserts that there is a 
temporal cascade of processing such that DLPFC comes online first and in turn influences 
later ACC activity.  When incorrect responses are made during a task, anterior regions of 
the ACC signal the posterior DLPFC to assert stronger top-down control on future trials.   
Most work in the psychopathology literature investigating cognitive control 
deficits in emotional contexts has focused on negative stimuli.  Excluding positive stimuli 
leaves unclear whether the observed attentional problems are valence-specific, or are 
actually driven by highly arousing stimuli.  There is some evidence that anxious individuals 
selectively attend to both positive and negative stimuli, supporting the possibility that 
anxiety is associated with enhanced processing of emotionally arousing, salient 
information, not just negative stimuli (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Martin, 
Williams, & Clark, 1991; Sass et al., 2010).  Similarly, the depression literature has focused 
primarily on the role of negative stimuli in triggering and perpetuating depressive 
symptoms.  However, when positive stimuli were included in studies, they were rarely 
equated with negative stimuli on arousal levels.  The inclusion of positive stimuli is 
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important for understanding cognitive and emotional dysfunction in depression because 
evidence suggests that depressed individuals exhibit reduced emotional reactivity to both 
negative and positive stimuli (Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002; Rottenberg, 
Gross, & Gotlib, 2005) and allocate insufficient attentional resources to pleasant stimuli 
(Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997; Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; 
McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000).  The present study included both positive and negative 
stimuli matched on arousal in order to avoid the potential confound between valence and 
arousal, as well as to explore the possibility that trait and state NA are associated with 
difficulties disengaging attention from salient, distracting information (which has received 
some empirical support; e.g., Bredemeier et al., 2011; Compton, 2000). 
The present study was motivated by the possibility that attentional-control deficits 
will help to understand the nature and mechanisms involved in potentially distinct 
contributions that trait and state NA make in initiating and maintaining mental disorders.  
Trait NA was hypothesized to be associated with decreased activation in posterior DLPFC, 
as well as other areas involved in top-down attentional control, in the context of 
emotionally arousing, distracting information.  In contrast, state NA was expected to 
facilitate the processing of emotionally arousing, salient stimuli and thus to be linked to 
increased activation in mid-DLPFC as well as other areas involved in bottom-up 
processing.  Additional, exploratory analyses examined the neural correlates of the 
interactive effects of trait and state NA, given that many individuals high in trait NA are 
also likely to experience frequent negative mood states and that behavioral research has 
found that the interaction between traits and states has important implications for 
understanding their impact on cognitive processing and behavior (e.g., MacLeod & 






One hundred and one paid participants (62 females, age M =34.57, SD =9.27) 
were recruited from the local community. All participants were right-handed, native 
speakers of English with self-reported normal color vision, and no reported neurological 
disorders or impairments. Participants were given a laboratory tour, informed of the 
procedures of the study, and screened for claustrophobia and other contraindications for 
MRI participation. Thirty additional participants were excluded from analyses for a 
variety of reasons, including excessive motion in the scanner, technical errors during 
fMRI acquisition, loss of questionnaire or reaction time data, outliers on the 
questionnaires or in reaction time (outliers are defined as greater than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean), or error rates exceeding 15%.  
 
Questionnaires 
During the laboratory tour, participants completed the General Temperament 
Survey (GTS) to assess trait negative affect using the Negative Temperament scale 
(Watson & Clark, 1993).  The Negative Temperament scale includes 28 items describing 
attitudes, feelings, interests, and other characteristics.  Participants were instructed to 
decide if each statement mostly described them or not and rate each item as either true or 
false.  Sample items include “I often have strong feelings such as anxiety or anger 
without really knowing why,” “I sometimes get all worked up as I think about things that 
happened during the day,” and “Often life feels like a big struggle.”  State NA was 
measured using the Negative Affect scale from the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994), which was administered 
immediately before participants performed the task during fMRI.  Participants indicated 
the extent to which they were feeling 10 negative emotions (e.g., afraid, nervous, 





Stimuli and Experimental Design  
Participants performed two tasks, a color-word Stroop and an emotion-word 
Stroop, during the fMRI session and also in a similar EEG session.  Only fMRI data from 
the emotion-word Stroop task are reported here.  The order of the Stroop tasks within 
session and the order of fMRI and EEG sessions were counterbalanced.  The emotion-
word Stroop task consisted of blocks of positive or negative emotion words alternating 
with blocks of neutral words.  Each participant received one of eight orders designed to 
ensure that the blocks of emotional and neutral words preceded each other equally often.  
There was a brief rest period after every fourth block.  Additionally, there were four 
fixation blocks (one at the beginning, one at the end, and two in the middle) in which a 
brighter fixation cross was presented for 1,500 ms, followed by a dimmer fixation cross 
for an average of 500 ms.   
Participants received 256 trials in 16 blocks (4 positive, 8 neutral, 4 negative) of 
16 trials, with a variable ITI (±225 ms) averaging 2,000 ms between trial onsets.  A trial 
began with the presentation of a word for 1,500 ms, followed by a fixation cross for an 
average of 500 ms.  Each trial consisted of one word presented in one of four ink colors 
(red, yellow, green, blue). Participants were instructed to press one of four buttons to 
indicate the color in which the word appeared on the screen, while ignoring the word 
meaning (thus making it irrelevant to the task). Each color occurred equally often with 
each word type (positive, neutral, negative), and trials were pseudorandomized such that 
no more than two trials featuring the same color appeared in a row.  Participants 
completed 32 practice trials prior to the task to ensure they understood the task 
instructions and the mapping between colors and buttons.   
The 256 emotion-word stimuli were selected from the Affective Norms for 
English Words (ANEW) set (Bradley & Lang, 1999).  Sixty-four positive (e.g., birthday, 
laughter), 64 negative (e.g., suicide, war), and two sets of 64 neutral (e.g., hydrant, 
moment) words were carefully selected on the basis of established norms for valence, 
arousal, word length, and frequency of use in the English language (Bradley & Lang, 
1999).  Both positive and negative words were selected to be highly arousing, whereas 
the neutral words were selected to be low in arousal (see Herrington et al., 2010, for 
detailed stimulus characteristics).  Stimuli were displayed using back projection, and 
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word presentation and reaction-time measurement were controlled by STIM software 
(James Long Company, Caroga Lake, NY). 
 
Image Acquisition  
MR data were collected using a 3T Siemens Allegra scanner.  Gradient field maps 
were collected to correct for geometric distortions in the functional data caused by 
magnetic field inhomogeneity (Jezzard & Balaban, 1995).  Three hundred and seventy 
functional images were acquired using a Siemens gradient-echo echo-planar imaging 
sequence (TR 2,000 ms, TE 25 ms, flip angle 80°, FOV 22 cm).  Thirty-eight contiguous 
oblique axial slices (slick thickness 3 mm, in-plane resolution 3.4375 mm x 3.4375 mm, 
.3 mm gap between slices) were acquired parallel to the anterior and posterior 
commissures.  After the functional acquisition, an MPRAGE structural sequence was also 
acquired (160 slices, slice thickness 1 mm, in-plane resolution 1 mm x 1 mm) for 
registering each participant's functional data to standard space. 
 
fMRI Data Reduction and Analysis 
 Image processing and statistical analyses were implemented primarily using the 
FSL analysis package (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).  Functional data for each 
participant were motion-corrected using rigid-body registration via FMRIB's linear 
registration tool MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002).  Spikes or 
sudden intensity shifts were corrected using AFNI's 3dDespike program 
(http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/).  The time series of 1 participant was truncated due to 
excessive motion only at the end of the scan.  All other participants demonstrated less 
than 3.3 mm absolute motion or 2 mm relative motion (the participants with motion 
exceeding this threshold were excluded from analysis as discussed above, leaving 
N=101).  After motion correction and despiking, each time series was corrected for 
geometric distortions caused by magnetic field inhomogeneity.  Remaining preprocessing 
steps, single-subject statistics, and higher-level regression analyses were done with FEAT 
(FMRI Expert Analysis Tool, FMRIB's Software Library, 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/analysis/research/feat/). The first three fMRI volumes of each 
time series were discarded in order to allow the MR signal to reach a steady state. The 
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data were then intensity-normalized, temporally filtered with a high-pass filter, and 
spatially smoothed using a 3D Gaussian kernal (FWHM = 5mm).  
 Regression analyses were then performed on each participant's time series using 
FILM, FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model with autocorrelation correction (Woolrich, 
Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001).  Statistical maps were generated via multiple regression 
computed for each intracerebral voxel.  Four explanatory variables (EV) were created for 
each condition (positive, neutral, negative, and rest) and included in the regression model, 
with fixation left as the unmodeled baseline.  Each explanatory variable was convolved 
with a gamma function to approximate the temporal course of the blood-oxygen-
dependent (BOLD) hemodynamic response function.  Each explanatory variable or 
regressor yielded a per-voxel effect-size parameter estimate (β) map representing the 
magnitude of activation associated with that explanatory variable.  In order to create the 
comparison of interest, β values for the relevant parameters were contrasted.  The 
contrast of interest was the arousal contrast (positive and negative words jointly 
compared with neutral words).  
  For each participant, the functional activation maps were warped into a common 
stereotaxic space (the 2009 Montreal Neurological Institute 152 symmetrical 1mm x 
1mm x 1mm template; Fonov, Evans, McKinstry, Almli, & Collins, 2009) using 
FMRIB’s Non-Linear Image Registration Tool, FNIRT (Andersson, Jenkinson, & Smith, 
2007).  First, the middle volume of the functional scan was registered to the structural 
scan using rigid-body registration (only allowing xyz translation and rotation).  Next, the 
structural scan was registered to the MNI template using a two-step process.  First, a 
linear registration was carried out, allowing xyz translation, rotation, zoom, and shear.  
Finally, a non-linear registration using cubic b-spline basis functions was carried out, 
using the results of the linear registration as a starting point.  The three registration steps 
(rigid-body function to structural, affine structural to MNI, & non-linear structural to 
MNI) were concatenated to create a warp mapping functional to MNI space and then 
applied to the β maps.   
Cross-subject inferential statistical analyses of brain activation were carried out 
using FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects).   The arousal contrast was 
entered as a dependent variable into a multiple regression analysis with questionnaire 
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scores (GTS Negative Temperament scale for trait NA and PANAS-X NA scale for state 
NA) entered as continuous predictors to predict activation voxel-by-voxel.  Two different 
higher-level analysis approaches served to identify (1) brain areas associated with both 
trait and state NA and (2) brain areas showing distinct relationships to them.  First, 
separate regressions were performed for each questionnaire (without the shared variance 
from the other questionnaire removed). These essentially provided zero-order correlations 
between trait or state NA and each brain voxel. These were followed by a conjunction 
analysis to reveal areas in common for trait and state NA (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, 
Wager, & Poline, 2005). A conjunction z map was created by comparing the z value of 
each voxel in the trait NA map with the z value in the state NA map. If the z scores were 
of opposite signs, the value for the voxel in the conjunction z map was set to zero. If the z 
scores were in the same direction, the value for the voxel in the conjunction z map was 
assigned to the z value with the weaker significance.  The conjunction z map was then 
thresholded to identify significant clusters, using the thresholded method described 
below.  Second, the GTS NT and PANAS-X NA scores were entered as predictors into a 
higher-level regression analyses that included both predictors.  The resulting β map for 
each predictor reflected the unique variance associated with that predictor. Because the 
conjunction analyses identified no shared brain regions, and results for the zero-order 
correlations in the first set of analyses generally resembled results from the second set of 
analyses, the latter are reported below. The interaction between trait and state NA was 
added as a third IV to this latter analysis to examine regions where the relationship 
between trait NA and brain activation depended on the level of state NA. 
Significantly activated voxels were identified via thresholding of per-voxel t-tests 
conducted on contrast βs maps that were converted to z-scores.  All hypotheses regarding 
the main effects of trait and state NA were directional, justifying one-tailed tests for these 
analyses.  Monte Carlo simulations via AFNI’s AlphaSim program were used to estimate 
the overall significance level (probability of a false detection) for thresholding the 3D 
functional z-map image (Ward, 2000).  The simulations were conducted for several 
individual voxel z-threshold values, providing the appropriate cluster size giving an 
overall family-wise error rate of p ≤ 0.05 (although all clusters reported here survived a 
more stringent family-wise error rate of p = .01). 
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To limit the number of voxels under consideration and examine a priori regions of 
interest, masks for the frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and parietal cortex were 
created based on the Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas available with FSL.  For each of 
these masks, a cluster-size threshold was computed and used only for voxels within the 
mask.  A threshold z-value of 2.0537 was used for all masks.  The minimum cluster sizes 
for the masks were: frontal cortex = 702 mm3, ACC = 351 mm3, parietal cortex = 780 
mm
3
.  A whole-brain gray-matter mask was used to examine areas not involved in a 
priori hypotheses (cluster size threshold = 1,170 mm3).  All analyses were also conducted 
using two-tailed tests, with results largely in line with the planned one-tailed tests.  In no 
case did a two-tailed test result in significant clusters in the direction opposite to 
hypothesis.  Two-tailed results for these analyses are thus not reported here.  Because the 
analysis examining the interaction between trait and state NA was exploratory, two-tailed 




Research supports important distinctions in functional specialization of the two 
hemispheres, particularly the frontal cortex (e.g., Engels et al., 2007; 2010; Herrington et 
al., 2005; 2010, Spielberg, et al., 2010; for reviews, see Heller, Nitschke, & Miller, 1998; 
Herrington, Koven, Heller, Miller, & Nitschke, 2009).  Therefore, analyses were 
conducted for the clusters that emerged in the frontal cortex to determine whether they 
were significantly lateralized.  Lateralization was tested using a locally written Matlab 
program.  This program implemented a repeated-measures homogeneity of slopes 
General Linear Model, with hemisphere as the repeated measure, trait and state NA 
scores as continuous predictors, and fMRI activation for the arousal contrast as the 
dependent variable.  This ANCOVA was conducted on a per-voxel basis, and the 
resultant β maps were thresholded as described above, with the exception that F-tests 
were used.  Because testing laterality determines whether the beta in a voxel in the right 
hemisphere is significantly different from the beta in the homologous voxel in the left 
hemisphere, half as many tests are conducted as in a full-brain analysis.  Therefore, a 




Behavioral Data  
Average RTs were computed for each condition (positive, neutral, and negative), 
and an arousal interference score was calculated by subtracting each participants’ average 
neutral-word RT from the mean of their positive-word and negative-word RT averages.  
Higher interference scores indicated that participants took longer to respond to 
emotionally arousing words than neutral words.  To examine the relationship between 
trait and state NA and arousal interference, arousal RT interference was entered as a 
dependent variable in regression analyses first with each questionnaire entered separately 
and second with the questionnaires entered simultaneously as predictors.  The interaction 
between trait and state NA was added to this latter analysis to examine whether the 
relationship between trait NA and arousal interference depended on the level of state NA.  
The same regression analyses were repeated, except with overall number of task errors as 
the dependent variable. 
 
Analysis of Brain Activation and Behavior Relationships 
 In order to explore the relationship between behavioral performance and neural 
activation in the clusters associated with trait and state NA, β values were averaged 
across all voxels in each cluster to create a single score for each participant.  Correlations 
between arousal RT interference and cluster scores, as well as number of task errors and 





Table 1 lists the results of the regression analyses for the behavioral data.  State 
NA was associated with arousal-related RT interference and total number of task errors, 
such that higher levels of state NA were associated with 1) responding more slowly to 
emotionally arousing words than to neutral words and 2) committing more errors.  Trait 
NA was not associated with arousal RT interference or errors.  The interaction between 
trait and state NA predicted task errors, such that high state NA was associated with 
committing more task errors when co-occurring trait NA was high. 
 
Brain regions uniquely associated with trait negative affect   
 Table 2 lists the four regions that were negatively correlated with trait negative 
affect.  In line with hypotheses, higher levels of trait NA were associated with less brain 
activation in areas involved in attentional control: left posterior DFPFC (middle frontal 
gyrus extending into precentral gyrus), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), and 
precuneus (see Figure 1).  In addition, a cluster emerged in left caudate when using the 
whole-brain gray-matter mask.  As mentioned above, there were no significant clusters 
positively correlated with trait negative affect.   
 
Brain regions uniquely associated with state negative affect   
 Table 2 lists the regions that were positively correlated with state negative affect.  
In line with hypotheses, higher levels of state NA were associated with more activation in 
mid-DLPFC (middle frontal gyrus, extending into inferior frontal gyrus), ACC, and 
precuneus (see Figure 1).  Three separate clusters emerged in the ACC: rACC, dorsal 
ACC (dACC), and posterior dACC.  In addition to mid-DLPFC, a second cluster 
emerged using the frontal cortex mask: left medial frontal cortex.  Finally, when using the 
whole-brain gray-matter mask, two additional clusters emerged: one in left 
parahippocampal gyrus and one spanning left and right nucleus accumbens/caudate. 





The interactive effects of trait and state negative affect 
Table 3 lists the seven regions significantly negatively correlated with the 
interaction between trait and state NA.  These regions include left DLPFC (lateral middle 
frontal gyrus), medial superior frontal gyrus, bilateral superior parietal cortex (extending 
into occipital cortex), bilateral middle temporal gyrus, and occipital cortex (spanning 
intracalcarine cortex/lingual gyrus/occipital fusiform gyrus; see Figure 2).  Graphing the 
interaction showed that increased trait NA was associated with decreased activation in 
these areas at high levels of state NA.  No regions were positive correlated with the 
interaction between trait and state NA.  
 
Lateralization analyses 
Lateralization analyses were conducted to explore whether the three left frontal 
clusters (posterior DLPFC associated with trait NA, mid-DLPFC/IFG associated state 
NA, and lateral MFG associated their interaction) were significantly lateralized.  Only the 
lateral MFG cluster associated with the interaction between trait and state NA was left 
lateralized. 
 
Correlations between brain activation and behavior 
 As presented in Table 2, all clusters associated with trait and state NA were 
positively correlated with reaction time to high-arousing versus neutral stimuli.  These 
positive correlations indicate that as activation in these areas increased, participants were 
more distracted by the emotional nature of the words.  Furthermore, as seen in Table 3, 
five of the seven clusters associated with the interaction between trait and state NA were 
also positively correlated with RT interference for arousing words, including left DLPFC 
(middle frontal gyrus), medial superior frontal gyrus, left superior parietal cortex, and left 
and right middle temporal gyrus.  Only the cluster located in mid-DLPFC (positively 
associated with state NA) was marginally correlated with error rate (r = .17, p = .08).  As 






Less activation in posterior DLPFC for higher levels of trait NA was consistent 
with hypotheses.  However, it was expected that less activation in this region would be 
associated with decrements in performance, such that individuals with high levels of trait 
NA would have more difficulty ignoring the arousing nature of the stimuli given their 
difficulty recruiting posterior DLPFC to implement top-down attentional control.  
However, the positive correlation between brain activation in this area and RT 
interference indicated that less activation in posterior DLPFC was associated with better 
performance (less distraction by the emotional words).  A multiple mediation analysis 
was conducted to investigate the possibility that the impact of posterior DLPFC 
activation on behavioral performance is actually mediated by other brain areas (see 
Figure 3).  This hypothesis is in line with the cascade-of-control model, which posits that 
the ACC comes online after the DLPFC in order to implement response-related 
attentional processes, such as evaluating responses. 
The multiple mediation model involves an independent variable (IV), j possible 
mediators (M), and a dependent variable (DV).  In the present model, the IV was left 
posterior DLPFC, the DV was arousal RT interference, and the possible mediators were 
the rACC, precuneus, and caudate clusters that emerged from the trait NA analysis.  The 
multiple mediation model allows for the testing of several potential mediators 
simultaneously and has several advantages over testing separate simple mediation 
models.  It can be used to determine 1) whether an overall effect exists (analogous to 
conducting a regression analyses with multiple predictors and evaluating total R2) and 2) 
whether specific variables mediate the direct effect (conditional on other mediators being 
included in the model).  It also reduces the likelihood of parameter bias due to omitted 
variables (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008, for discussion).  Furthermore, it is more 
convenient, precise, and parsimonious to examine all possible mediators in the same 
model. 
Following the recommendation of Preacher and Hayes (2008), mediation 
(examined via significance of the indirect effect aj x bj) was determined by using 
bootstrapped confidence intervals rather than the Sobel (1982) test.  The bootstrap 
method is preferred over the Sobel test because the former does not require the 
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assumption of a normal distribution.  The indirect effect has an asymmetrical distribution 
in finite samples and is normal only in large samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008).  
Furthermore, simulations have shown that bootstrapping methods have higher power 
while still performing well regarding Type I error rates (MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood & Williams, 2004).  The SPSS 
macro script of Preacher and Hayes (2008) was used to conduct multiple mediation 
analyses by calculating 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence 
intervals for the indirect effect involving 5000 repetitions.   
The results of the mediation analyses are presented in Table 4.  The total indirect 
effect was significant, as was each of the specific indirect effects, indicating that the 
rACC, precuneus and caudate clusters mediated the relationship between posterior 
DLPFC activation and RT interference.  As shown in the table, the effect of posterior 
DLPFC on RT interference was reduced from .67 to .06 by the three mediators, going 
from a significant (p = .0001) to nonsignificant (p = .84) relationship, indicating full 
mediation.  Consistent with the cascade-of-control model, rACC mediated the 
relationship between DLPFC and RT interference.  Importantly, when the other areas 
were in the model, the effect of rACC on RT interference (path b) was negative, 
indicating that less activation in the rACC is associated with more interference from 
arousing stimuli (when partialling out the effect of the posterior DLPFC).  Thus, less 
activation in posterior DLPFC is associated with less activation in rACC, which is in turn 














Trait negative affect 
The present study tested hypotheses about relationships between self-reported 
trait and state negative affect (NA) and activity in specific brain regions supporting 
control of attention during emotional challenge.  As hypothesized, trait NA was 
associated with less activation in areas involved in attentional control, including posterior 
DLPFC, precuneus, and rACC, during an emotion-word Stroop task.  Studies of healthy 
individuals have found that posterior DLPFC plays a key role in successfully 
implementing top-down control in order to ignore distracting information and focus on 
the task at hand (Banich, 2009; Banich et al., 2000a, 2000b, 2009; Compton et al., 2003; 
Milham, Banich, & Barad, 2003).  The present finding that trait NA is negatively related 
to posterior DLPFC activation supports the contention that individuals high in trait NA 
have difficulty engaging top-down aspects of attentional control and maintaining task 
goals (Banich, 2009; Herrington et al., 2010).  Less activation in left posterior DLPFC in 
individuals high in trait NA is consistent with studies that examined individuals high in 
anhedonic depression and found less activity in this area following negative than 
following neutral words (Engels et al., 2010; Herrington et al., 2010).  The present study 
extends these findings by demonstrating that abnormal processing in this area is not 
specific to depression but is associated with trait NA, a more general risk factor for 
developing and maintaining various forms of psychopathology, particularly anxiety and 
depression (Ormel et al., 2004).  Furthermore, present results indicate that individuals 
high in trait NA have difficulty ignoring salient, arousing information (both positively 
and negatively valenced), suggesting that their attentional deficit is not specific to 
negative stimuli.  This finding is consistent with research showing that neuroticism is 
associated with difficulty ignoring salient distracters during a non-emotional task 
(Bredemeier et al., 2011). 
Corbetta et al. (2008) have also asserted that posterior portions of the frontal 
cortex (extending into the frontal eye fields and premotor areas) are part of a dorsal 
frontoparietal network involved in the top-down selection of stimuli that are congruent 
with goals as well as expectations based on previous experiences.  Furthermore, posterior 
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DLPFC appears to feed top-down signals to a separate ventral attentional network 
involved in detecting salient stimuli in order to bias processing of the appropriate 
stimulus features (Corbetta et al., 2008).  As reviewed above, individuals high in trait NA 
tend to ignore meaningful contextual details and rely excessively on pre-existing, 
context-independent knowledge.  Dysfunction in a key node of the dorsal attentional 
network may explain why these individuals have difficulty appropriately integrating pre-
existing information with current goals in order to attend to the information in their 
environment that is most relevant.  Functional impairments in posterior DLPFC also 
perturb activity in other areas, particularly parietal regions that receive top-down 
modulation from it.  In the present study, less activation in a cluster in the parietal cortex 
associated with trait NA, the precuneus, suggests that this area fails to receive top-down 
signals from posterior DLPFC that bias processing toward task-relevant aspects of 
stimulus representations (color information) and away from irrelevant features (word 
information; Banich et al., 2000).  Additionally, the precuneus appears to be a central 
“hub” linking the frontal cortex with other parietal areas (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009).  
Thus, dysfunction in the precuneus may also prevent the successful modulation of other 
key parietal areas by frontal regions.  
 High trait NA was also associated with decreased activation in rACC, a region 
involved in evaluating interference from emotionally salient distracters and implementing 
attentional control to ignore these task-irrelevant stimuli (Mohanty et al., 2007; 
Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Whalen et al., 1998).  The cascade-of-
control model (Banich, 2009), based on a series of studies examining the color-word 
Stroop task and variants of it, asserts that attentionally demanding tasks first recruit the 
DLPFC, which in turn influences later ACC activity, specifically the dorsal portion of 
this region.  However, in the present study, the cluster that was significantly associated 
with trait NA was located in the rostral portion of the ACC.  This is consistent with work 
that found rACC engaged during attentional control tasks involving emotional 
information (e.g., emotion-word Stroop), whereas dACC was engaged during non-
emotional attentionally demanding tasks (e.g., color-word Stroop; Bush et al., 2000; 
Mohanty et al., 2007).  The combination of hypoactivity in both posterior DLPFC and 
rACC regions in individuals high in trait NA suggests they have difficulty exerting top-
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down control to handle conflict from emotional distracters.  Furthermore, the finding that, 
for the sample as a whole, rACC activation mediated the relationship between posterior 
DLPFC activation and RT interference suggests that DLPFC failed to recruit rACC to 
compensate for poor attentional control, thus leading to increased distraction from 
emotionally arousing stimuli.  Similar deficits in the frontocingulate network have been 
observed in anxious individuals and may be related high levels of trait NA rather than 
anxiety-specific symptoms (Bishop et al., 2004; Engels et al., 2007).   
 
State negative affect 
 In contrast to trait NA, state NA was associated with increased activation in areas 
involved in attentional control, including mid-DLPFC, precuneus, rACC, and dACC.  
Previous studies support the role of mid-DLPFC in the selection and processing of 
specific aspects of stimuli in the environment (Banich, 2009; Engels et al., 2007; 
Herrington et al., 2005; 2010).  Successful implementation of attentional control is 
associated with engaging mid-DLPFC to select the most pertinent features and ignore 
irrelevant ones.  Mid-DLPFC (an anterior portion of middle frontal gyrus) has been 
proposed to be part of the stimulus-driven ventral attentional network, functionally and 
anatomically separate from the top-down dorsal attentional network described above 
(Corbetta et al., 2008).  In the present study, the cluster in mid-DLPFC extended ventrally 
into inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), another key node in the ventral attentional network.  
This network is involved in detecting salient stimuli in the surroundings and determining 
their behavioral relevance (Corbetta et al., 2008).  This network interrupts top-down 
processing in order to reorient attention to stimuli that have been determined to be 
“important” or relevant. Hyperactivity in mid-DLPFC has been linked to too much 
engagement with irrelevant features of stimuli (the meaning of threat words in the 
emotion-word Stroop), interfering with processing task-relevant features (word color; 
Engels et al., 2010).  In the present study, individuals high in state NA appear to have 
been paying too much attention to the emotional aspects of the words, which impeded 
their ability to focus on the color of the words.  This explanation is supported by the 
significant relationship between increased activity in mid-DLPFC and greater behavioral 
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(RT) interference for emotionally arousing than for neutral words.  Mid-DLPFC 
activation was also marginally positively correlated with overall task errors.   
 State NA was also associated with three clusters in the anterior cingulate cortex: 
one in the anterior portion of dACC, one in the posterior portion of dACC, and one in 
rACC.  Whereas previous work has highlighted the key role dACC plays in implementing 
attentional control during non-emotional tasks, evidence suggests that it is also recruited 
in contexts involving emotional distracters (Mohanty et al., 2007).  The anterior portion 
of dACC appears to be involved in response evaluation, with activity increasing when the 
likelihood of making errors during a task is greater (Banich, 2009; Milham & Banich, 
2005).  The posterior portion of dACC is engaged during late-stage attentional 
processing, such that it determines what information to use to guide response selection 
(Banich, 2009; Milham et al., 2001, 2003).  Additionally, if DLPFC function earlier in 
the processing stream is problematic, posterior dACC must deal with unresolved 
selection issues.  In the present study, increased activation in both portions of the dACC 
was associated with increased interference from emotional stimuli.  Given that high state 
NA individuals engage in excessive processing of salient stimuli, increased dACC 
activity appears to reflect 1) unsuccessful attempts to compensate for dysfunctional 
DLPFC control and 2) attempts to signal the DLPFC to engage stronger top-down control 
in the future, in order to override bottom-up processing (Banich, 2009; Milham et al., 
2003).  
A third cluster in the anterior cingulate was located in the rostral portion, 
overlapping with the cluster that emerged in the trait NA analysis.  However, the 
relationship between state NA and rACC was in the direction opposite that of trait NA, 
such that increased levels of state NA were associated with increased activation in rACC.  
In addition to being involved in attentional control during emotional tasks, rACC has 
been implicated in regulating emotional states and responses to emotional material (Bush 
et al., 2000).  Increased rACC activation has also been linked to symptom provocation in 
individuals with anxiety disorders (Bush et al., 2000; Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; 
Drevets & Raichle, 1998; Whalen et al., 1998).  A cluster in medial frontal cortex also 
emerged in the state NA analysis.  Similar to rACC, this region has also been implicated 
in various functions related to affective states, including negative emotional responses to 
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pictures, as well as making attributions about emotional states (Lane & McRae, 2004; 
Ochsner et al., 2004; 2009).  Increased activation in both rACC and medial frontal cortex 
in the present study for individuals high in state NA suggests that they were overly 
involved in attending to the emotional content of the stimuli and/or their own mood 
states. 
 State NA was also associated with activation in the precuneus and 
parahippocampal gyrus.  As described above, activation in the precuneus is linked to the 
strengthening of particular aspects of stimulus representations over other features.  Given 
that precuneus activation was associated with difficulty ignoring the emotional content of 
the words, it is likely that individuals high in state NA were biasing the processing of 
word meaning instead of word color.  Previous studies using the Stroop task found that 
decreased parahippocampal activity was associated with the successful implementation of 
attentional control (Compton et al., 2003).   Since this area is associated with the binding 
together of information, deactivation in this area during the Stroop was thought to reflect 
inhibiting the binding of ink color and word meaning in order to facilitate task 
performance.  Increased activation in the hippocampal gryus in the present study may 
indicate that individuals high in state NA were binding together this information, which 
contributed to detriments in their performance. 
As reviewed above, individuals in negative moods tend to engage in a systematic 
processing strategy that relies on bottom-up processing and attention to situational 
details.  Instead of relying on pre-existing information, they utilize knowledge that is 
context-dependent.  The pattern of brain activity associated with high state NA suggests 
that, when individuals are in negative moods, they engage in excessive bottom-up 
processing of salient stimuli. This is problematic when these stimuli are not behaviorally 
relevant for the task at hand.  In effect, these individuals are constantly interrupting top-
down processing in order to reorient attention to focus on irrelevant contextual 
information, which penalizes their performance during tasks involving salient distracters. 
 
Interactive effects of trait and state negative affect 
The results of the present study indicate that individuals who have high levels of 
both trait and state NA exhibit a distinct pattern of brain activation in the context of 
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emotional distraction, beyond the additive effects of trait and state NA.  The clusters that 
emerged for the interaction analysis of trait and state NA did not overlap with any of the 
clusters associated with the main effects, highlighting the importance of considering the 
interactive effects of these emotional facets.  Relative to individuals high in only trait or 
state NA, individuals high in both showed less activation in lateral middle frontal gyrus 
and medial superior frontal gyrus, indicating difficulty maintaining a top-down goal-
congruent task set while dealing with conflicting emotional information (Ferstl, Rinck, & 
Cramon, 2005; Schirmer, Zysset, Kotz, & Yves von Cramon, 2004; Spielberg et al., 
2010).   
Individuals high in trait and state NA also exhibited decreased activation in 
several areas early in the dorsal processing stream, including occipital cortex, bilateral 
middle temporal gyrus, and bilateral superior parietal areas.  Hypoactivation in visual and 
temporal areas in conjunction with hypoactivation in frontal areas indicates that these 
regions were not receiving modulation from the prefrontal cortex to bias processing of 
the appropriate sensory representations (Banich et al., 2000b).  Given that the superior 
parietal cortex is part of the dorsal top-down attentional network, decreased activation in 
this region suggests that these individuals have more difficulty allocating attentional 
resources in a top-down manner than do individuals high in only trait or state NA 
(Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Husain & Nachev, 2007).   
 
Conclusion 
 Overall, results of the present study indicate that trait NA, state NA, and their 
interaction have unique neural correlates.  High levels of trait NA negatively impact top-
down attentional processing, such that static aspects of attentional control that maintain 
goals across time are compromised.  Specifically, individuals high in trait NA have 
difficulty sustaining attention and persisting in goal achievement in environments 
involving salient distractions.  Given that the top-down attentional system is also 
involved in anticipating and preparing for upcoming tasks (Corbetta et al., 2008), the 
dysfunction in this system observed in these individuals suggest that they experience 
deficits related to these functions as well.  Present results are consistent with research 
indicating that high trait anxious individuals exhibit problems engaging proactive control, 
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or “sustaining representation of task requirements or goals throughout periods of high 
control demand” (p. 240, Fales et al., 2008; though present results suggest such deficits 
are not specific to anxiety).  Difficulty implementing top-down attentional control in the 
face of distracting emotional information likely leads to the negative correlations 
associated with high levels of trait NA, including biased expectations, interpretations, and 
attributions of environmental information.  High trait NA individuals appear to rely 
excessively on (potentially inappropriate) knowledge based on previous experiences, 
failing to integrate it with pertinent information in current context in order to respond 
adaptively.   
In contrast to trait NA, high levels of state NA are associated with an over-
reliance on more transient aspects of attentional control and excessive bottom-up 
processing of salient information.  Hyperactivity of the stimulus-driven attentional 
network leads to repeated interruption of top-down processing in order to focus on 
contextual details that often turn out to be irrelevant to the task at hand.  Whereas 
individuals high in trait NA appear to be ineffective at incorporating information from 
their immediate environment, those high in state NA appear to have the opposite 
problem, such that they have difficulty appropriately attending to ongoing goals.  The 
present findings support the assertion that trait NA is not simply the tendency to 
experience negative moods; rather it has correlates that are dissociable from state NA.  
Furthermore, present results contribute to the understanding of the likely psychological 
and biological mechanisms through which trait and state NA differentially trigger and 
maintain symptoms associated with anxiety and depression.  Importantly, these two 
emotional facets are associated with distinct attentional control deficits.    
Present results have implications for the prevention and treatment of 
psychological disorders.  Intervention methods should target maladaptive aspects of both 
bottom-up and top-down processing, such that individuals learn to engage the two 
attentional systems flexibly and strike an appropriate balance between them.  It has been 
suggested that deficits in bottom-up processing may be modified through  behavioral 
reinforcement methods, whereas top-down problems can be addressed using a cognitive 
restructuring approach (see Ochsner et al., 2009).  Future work should determine whether 
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the combination of these methods will effectively target the additional attentional deficits 
that individuals high in both trait and state NA exhibit. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 
Regression analyses for behavioral data 
                                                                             DV = Arousal  RT interference 
Mediators Betat p R2 
Entered separately:    
           Trait NA (GTS NT) -.04 .70 .00 
           State NA (PANAS NA) .20 .04 .04 
Entered simultaneously:    
     Step 1:    
           GTS NT -.10 .32 .05 
           PANAS NA .23 .03  
     Step 2:    
          GTS NT x PANAS NA -.28 .62 .05 
                                                                           DV = Total task errors 
Entered separately:    
           GTS NT .11 .27 .01 
           PANAS NA .22 .03 .05 
Entered simultaneously:    
     Step 1:    
           GTS NT .06 .59 .05 
           PANAS NA .20 .05  
     Step 2:    
          GTS NT x PANAS NA 1.18 .04 .09 
Note. t = standardized betas, GTS NT = General Temperament Survey, Negative 





Brain areas moderated by trait and state negative affect and correlations with behavior 







X Y Z 
Trait Negative Affect        
L middle frontal gyrus/precentral gyrus 
(posterior DLPFC)a 3,200 Negative -2.35 -34 16 39 .38** 
Rostral anterior cingulate cortexb 1,430 Negative -2.41 -3 40 0 .27** 
Precuneusc 3,902 Negative -2.36 -3 -60 22 .45** 
L caudated 2,678 Negative -2.29 -10 5 3 .43** 
State Negative Affect        
L middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 
(mid-DLPFC)a 1,182 Positive 2.35 -26 29 40 .37** 
L medial frontal cortexa  1,124 Positive 2.31 -6 52 -10 .42** 
Rostral anterior cingulate cortexb   547 Positive 2.28 0 39 2 .26** 
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortexb  390 Positive 2.30 -9 33 21 .36** 
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Table 2 (cont.)        
Posterior dorsal anterior cingulate cortexb  586 Positive 2.33 -2 -3 36 .26** 
Precuneusc 5,471 Positive 2.48 -4 -62 21 .46** 
L parahippocampal gyrusd 1,636 Positive 2.42 -21 -14 -25 .24* 
L&R nucleus accumbens/caudated 3,230 Positive 2.45 -1 14 -2 .46** 
Note. L = left. R = right. Location = Coordinates are for the center-of-mass in MNI152 2009a symmetrical space.   
RT = Reaction time interference. a = Correction for only frontal cortex voxels. b = Correction for only anterior 
cingulate cortex voxels. c = Correction for only parietal cortex voxels.  d = Correction for all gray-matter voxels.       





Brain areas with interactive effects for trait and state negative affect and correlations with behavior 







X Y Z 
L lateral middle frontal gyrusa  2,828 Negative -2.52 -44 16 37 .32** 
Medial superior frontal gyrusa 2,750 Negative -2.37 -1 44 38 .37** 
L superior parietal cortex/occipital cortexa  2,594 Negative -2.42 -26 -72 39 .12* 
R superior parietal cortex/occipital cortexa 2,424 Negative -2.38 33 -69 45 .14 
L middle temporal gyrusa 7,422 Negative -2.60 -61 -37 -4 .43** 
R middle temporal gyrusa 6,990 Negative -2.43 58 -46 -3 .22* 
Occipital cortex (intracalcarine cortex/ 
lingual gyrus/occipital fusiform gyrus)a 24,198 Negative -2.43 -4 -74 -5 -.04 
Note. L = left. R = right. Location = Coordinates are for the center-of-mass in MNI152 2009a symmetrical space.  





Summary of multiple mediation analysis  
IV = L posterior DLPFC                                            DV = Arousal  RT interference 
Mediators (M) 
Path a 
(IV to M) 
 
Path b 
(M to DV)a 
 
Path c 
(IV to DV 
Total) 
Path c’ 
(IV to DV  
Direct) 
a x b 
(Indirect 
Effect) 
rACC 1.29** -.29*   -.37* 
Precuneus 1.06** .51** 
 
 .54** 
Caudate        1.34** .33* 
 
 .45* 
   .67** .06  
 
                                               Total Indirect Effect:       .61* 






Blue = negative correlation between brain activation and trait NA (panels A = D).  Red = positive correlation between brain activation 
and state NA (panels E-K).  L = Left.  Clusters of activation in A = left posterior DLPFC, B = rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), 
C = precuneus, D = left caudate, E = left mid-DLPFC, F = left medial frontal cortex, G = rACC and posterior dorsal ACC (dACC),    






Brain areas associated with the interaction between trait and state negative affect.  Blue = Less activation when both dimensions are 
high than when one dimension is high.  L = Left.  Clusters of activation in A: left lateral middle frontal gyrus and medial superior 
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